Introduction
The past two decades have witnessed significant change in the American electric utility system. The once-stable, secure, and regulated system no longer retains as much government oversight as in the past, being moved increasingly by the invisible hand of a competitive marketplace. While proponents of the evolving new system laud many of its benefits, others point to disturbing signs of increased susceptibility to terrorist attacks (and other disruptions) and decreased overall reliability. Novel approaches for restructuring the utility system continue to be made, reflecting the uncharacteristically fluid state of affairs that exists today.
This chapter explores the long-term trends in the electric utility system and the beginning of efforts to restructure it. To frame the analysis, the chapter draws on a nonengineering version of the systems approach that has been fruitfully developed for understanding socio-technical endeavors. The social-science systems approach provides a macroscopic way to view long-term trends. Going beyond consideration of engineering concerns, it encourages an understanding of the stakes, interests, and actions of a host of participants who make and use technologies. Such a view suggests that engineering concerns held by managers and technical leaders often do not necessarily determine the way a technological system emerges. Rather, economic, social, and political factors may play more important roles in moving elements of a system.
Applying the social-science systems approach, the chapter views the present time as a rare opportunity in which entrepreneurs can pursue implementation of a nontraditional type of generation technology. Known as distributed generation (DG), the family of technologies consists of small-scale, decentralized hardware that, if structured properly, can provide greater reliability, security, and efficiency to the utility system.
The chapter begins with a discussion of the social-science systems approach, highlighting the notion of momentum, a combination of technical and social components that give a system an apparent direction, speed, and inertia. It describes the origins of momentum in the system and explores the reasons why that momentum has diminished dramatically starting in the 1970s. To help create new momentum, proponents of distributed generation seek to gain acceptance for a host of potential benefits while eliminating impediments and uncertainties. The chapter concludes with an analysis of DG within the business environment and a suggested model that may succeed in advancing the new technology within a system that develops new momentum.
Overview of Concepts: Using the Systems Approach to Understand Change in the Utility System
To gain a sense of the development of electric utilities, we employ the socialscience version of the systems approach that was originally conceived of by Thomas [1] and other publications, Hughes posits that the generation, transmission and distribution of power takes place within a technological system. The system, however, goes beyond consideration of engineering elements (though they are components), including a "seamless web" of factors characterized as economic, administrative, educational, legal, and technical. Modern technological systems weave these considerations into one fabric, as system-builders (often business managers) seek to "construct or ... force unity from diversity, centralization in the face of pluralism, and coherence from chaos." [2] When successful, the managers help the system expand and flourish. At the same time, the system closes itself. Put differently, as the system grows, the influence on it from the outside environment diminishes, largely because the system's scope has enveloped elements that might have altered it. [3] The systems approach also comprehends the notion of momentum, which Hughes describes as a mass of "machines, devices, structures" and "business concerns, government agencies, professional societies, educational institutions and other organizations" that contains "a perceptible rate of growth or velocity." [4] In other words, momentum can be viewed as a "mass of technological, organizational and attitudinal components [that tend] to maintain their steady growth and direction." [5] The inclination of a system to evolve in a certain direction stems from the actions of a host of participants, such as regulatory bodies, educational institutions, the investment of money in operating hardware, and the efforts and industry culture of people working within the system. Momentum may also be aided by barriers to entry that favor established players, market and corporate dominance in an industry, and the lengthy lead times needed to develop new technologies. At the same time, momentum can grow due to the inertia of customers who may see few motivations to change buying habits, as well as due to market education and difficult-to-alter product life cycles. Together, these elements encourage business as usual and the noticeable demonstration of momentum. Hughes further argues that momentum can be abetted through employment of "conservative" inventions, namely new hardware that maintains the existing system. Leaders of system momentum clearly seek to preserve their dominance, and they avoid encouragement of novel and "radical" technologies that would displace their control. For example, Internet telephony and cell phones could be considered radical inventions by the corporate leaders of the conventional wired communications network.
Hughes. In his influential Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society
In short, the social-science systems approach views the development of systems as the result of managers' efforts to command elements that exploit the human, natural, and technical environment. As systems gain momentum and mature, they resist change.
Even so, momentum does not imply determinism (which suggests that social or technical elements determine technological development) or autonomy (which implies that technologies evolve independent of human action). Instead, system momentum can often be changed due to a confluence of technical, economic, and political factors. As will be described in this paper, the electric utility system has recently seen its momentum change in a way that provides opportunities for the introduction of distributed generation facilities.
Application of Principles: Origins and Growth of Momentum in the Electric Utility System
The electric utility system had humble beginnings near the end of the nineteenth century when the United States saw creation of a flourishing corporate-based economy.
Large multi-level companies exploited the potentials of new communications and transportation technologies to manage production and distribution of quantity-produced goods, thus overthrowing the once-common family-owned and operated businesses. The railroad industry served as the epitome of modern enterprises that exploited new technologies to eliminate regional competition, to gain octopus-like political and economic power, and to earn the contempt of many of its customers. [6] The fledgling electric utility companies that emerged after Thomas Edison opened his small Pearl Street, New York City power station in 1882 did not appear to be in the same class as the large, and often reviled, railroad corporations. After all, Edison conceived of a decentralized system within cities that included scores of relatively small generation plants, each providing direct current (DC) power to individual businesses. But rapid innovation in electric power production equipment altered the relatively benign character of business. Adopting alternating-current (AC) transmission and steam-turbine technologies, early utility entrepreneurs quickly found they could emulate trends in other industries. Through the use of transformers made available in the late 1880s, AC transmission allowed companies to distribute high-voltage power over long distances.
And in the first decade of the twentieth century, utility managers began employing compact steam turbines as prime movers that further encouraged centralization because the new machines offered tremendous economies of scale. (Put simply, as the turbines, connected to generators, produced larger capacities of power, the unit cost of electricity declined over a broad range of output.) Becoming the core conservative technologies used in the electric utility system, steam-turbine generators and alternating current technologies yielded exponentially growing supplies of power, produced at higher thermal efficiencies and lower costs and prices. Electricity changed from being viewed as an expensive product used only in special situations to a cheap commodity that Employment of conservative, slowly improving hardware enhanced the utility system's momentum. But non-engineering elements also did. Because it explicitly addresses such elements, the social-science systems approach focuses attention on the social nature of technological evolution. In the case of the utility system, the creation of regulatory bodies constituted a major driver of momentum. Unlike the railroad industry, which became regulated by government to stem perceived abuses, the electric utility industry actually sought oversight by state officials. As early as 1898, industry leader Samuel Insull argued that government oversight would offer legitimacy to power companies as monopolies. Once companies won dominance in a region, regulation would effectively create a barrier to entry and allow them to solidify their control.
Government oversight would also reduce financial risks because utility commissions would be required not only to protect customers against monopoly abuses, but to ensure that utilities earned enough money from customers to provide good service. [8] Winning the day, Insull saw state regulation spread rapidly after New York and Wisconsin created the first public utility commissions in 1907. Soon after the Progressive era ended during World War I, the quality of state regulators declined markedly, enabling utility managers largely to run the power system with only the appearance of dutiful oversight. Utility managers had effectively "captured" the regulatory mechanism, which helped them control a system that was developing significant momentum. [9] The system's momentum also grew because of the support of other stakeholders within society. Investment bankers, manufacturers of electrical equipment, educational institutions, and customers found reason to encourage development of an industry that employed large-scale technologies and appeared to bring universal benefits. [10] In other words, a variety of social groups implicitly supported a big, technology-dominated and regulated electric utility system. By the 1970s, the utility system had gained a huge amount of momentum that appeared unalterable. costs that compared favorably with (or was priced cheaper than) power generated by conventional utility plants. [13] In the language of Hughes' systems approach, these PURPA-inspired, small-scale technologies constituted radical technologies that helped alter the utility system's momentum. Through their use, the technologies enabled nonutility companies to compete (at least in the generation sector) with utilities that previously enjoyed vertically scenarios for operation of the system and for dealing with specific problems, such as the underinvestment of capital in an increasingly fragile-looking transmission network. [16] Using the language of the social-science systems approach, it appears that the human and technical components of the utility system have been severely altered, forever changing what had been substantial momentum.
Politics and System Momentum Change

Application of Principles: The Possibility of Distributed Generation and New Momentum
The semi-chaotic state of affairs that exists in the early twenty-first century has enabled distributed generation to gain a foothold. hydrogen-rich fuel and create electricity through a chemical process rather than by combustion, thus yielding few particulate wastes. [18] The process also yields heat, which can be used as a profitable by-product. Beyond these DG technologies are modular internal combustion engines that run on diesel fuel or gasoline. In their smallest versions (about 1 kW), they provide backup power for recreational vehicles and homes.
In larger packages, these engines provide backup power for hospitals and other large commercial enterprises. DG facilities may be established as isolated "islands"-disconnected from the transmission grid-or attached to it. In the latter case, they may constitute the primary producers of power for a user or serve as backup units. They can also be set up to add power to the grid for use by other customers.
The economic viability of these DG technologies has improved in recent years.
Technological advances in microturbines and reciprocating gas engines have lowered the cost and increased the efficiency of the small scale generation technologies. [19] Advances in net metering, fuel conversion technology, and thermal engineering have accompanied developments in automation and control, improving the economy of small units and reducing the need for periodic maintenance and inspection. [20] Small system technology can also be mass produced at a lower unit cost. For example, numerous companies offer fuel cell technology, which is viewed as having virtually no emissions, in ready-to-connect packages. Many policymakers also perceive gas turbines as having low initial investment, steam generation capabilities, and installation flexibility. [21] The 
Impediments to Decentralized Electricity Generation
Despite its potential benefits, the transition to a new DG paradigm will not occur effortlessly because of the existence of social, technical, political, and business related impediments. The most significant impediment may be the belief that decentralized units cost more than large centralized facilities. Cost projections for electricity often only include the capital cost of a generator, maintenance, and fuel. Such estimates exclude "external costs" in the form of pollution, decommissioning, and price swings for fuel and labor. These pricing schemes also fail to include many of the potential benefitsincluding reliability, efficiency, and security-that DG systems can provide.
Consequently, policymakers and consumers often think that renewable technologies (in particular) cannot compete effectively on costs with traditional fossil fuel sources of electricity. [36] The largest technical impediment consists of problems related to the connection of DG technologies to the grid. This interconnection conundrum really constitutes a set of aggregated technical problems: voltage control (keeping voltages within acceptable ranges), the balancing of reactive power (properly synchronizing power within the grid), and safety (ensuring the protection of people working on the grid, especially when parts of it are blacked out). Customers using DG technologies today often rely on customdesigned electronics packages to resolve these problems. But the large cost to create such packages serves as a disincentive for many users. Recognizing this problem, an IEEE Standards Coordinating Committee has begun developing rules for interface technologies that would enable DG users to "plug" into the grid directly and safely.
However, agreement on the specific details of the new standards remain years away. As of January 2, 2002, the list of committee members included 385 names of people, representing scores of investor-owned and public power utilities, manufacturers, government laboratories, state agencies, and consultants. Each player sees advantages and disadvantages to acceptance of any single technical standard, meaning that a consensus will be difficult to fashion. The problem again illustrates the social nature of technological change, as different players in the system view benefits and costs differently. [37] Possibly more important, regulatory and political inertia within the United States, in the form of financial subsidies and incentives, still favors fossil fueled electricity generation from large plants. For example, the tax code contains $13 billion in production, research and development tax credits for energy production in the years To be sure, some of these impediments can be mitigated by effective public policy. As noted, DG implementation suffers because some of the costs involved in producing power in the conventional sense are not borne directly by the companies that create those costs. Known generally as "externalities," these costs are imposed on society and are not included in the cost of conventional methods to produce power, thereby skewing conventional analyses of alternative power choices. However, government policies can impose taxes and other disincentives on activities that cause perceived harm to society. At the same time, they may provide incentives for use of technologies that will enhance public health, security, power reliability, and welfarebenefits that are difficult to quantify using traditional economic analyses. Several policy initiatives have been suggested for improving the likelihood of obtaining the society-wide benefits of DG implementation. They include creation of interconnection standards and contractual requirements so DG owners can gain access to the power grid at a fair cost and with reasonable, uniform technical requirements. Such an approach would minimize the need for expensive, time-consuming efforts to manufacture custom-designed interfaces. At the same time, DG implementation would benefit from establishment (by policy makers) of hourly retail markets for the trading of power between DG owners and the distribution grid. Such a market would allow DG owners and other consumers to benefit from the value of DG in reducing peak-load generation from utilities. Such markets remain in the experimental stage, though similar markets have been shown to provide useful incentives to small-scale generation technology users and energyefficiency technologies. Finally, some argue that creation of a level "playing field" among all types of generators (owned by utilities and nonutilities) would help eliminate unseen subsidies, costs, and benefits, and encourage proper consideration of alternatives.
Government policy would establish standardized requirements for emissions allowances, land use, building codes, and other key components of the production of power, helping users choose the most efficient design of a power delivery network. It would aid in the analysis of energy-efficiency alternatives as well by elucidating the true costs of all supply-side and demand-side alternatives.
Practical Consequences: Distributed Generation as a Business Enterprise
In the "real" world, these potential benefits and impediments are evaluated by men and women in the business community who seek to exploit opportunities in the altered electric utility system. This section examines in more detail the ways business people consider these factors and develop business decisions. The discussion ends with an analysis of a business model that incorporates economic and strategic factors to create a possible niche in the evolving utility system.
Four different categories of business entities appear likely to consider the implementation of DG technology as an element of a strategic plan. These include:
• Investor owned utilities (IOUs) and publicly owned utilities that may want to install DG units for supplying peak demand in areas that are located behind congested transmission lines.
• Manufacturers of DG systems, which have already advanced the technologies for DG on several fronts and, with the exception of large gas turbines, appear to be pacing their capacity growth by market growth.
• The new generator and consumer (NGC) that sees operation of DG units as a potential substitute for some or all of its purchases of electricity from utilities. Included in this category are industrial sites, apartment complexes, government agencies, military bases, universities, hospitals, shopping malls, and the like. On the horizon, NGCs may also become wholesale energy suppliers by interconnecting DG units.
• The contractor industry (CI) that performs one or more of the functions of designing, building, installing, and operating DG units. The viability of contractors depends on the rate of adoption of DG by the above categories of business entities.
For any organization, strategic business planning begins with an analysis of the organization's mission and the threats and opportunities that exist in the external environment. It continues with an examination of the firm's weaknesses and strengths (i.e., its internal environment). External threats include uncertain and rising electricity costs and the unreliability of power supplied by utilities. As managers scope out opportunities for changing their organization and developing a new strategic plan, they often consider four general categories: redesign and repositioning in the marketplace of the organization's products and services, improved selection and design of the processes that the organization uses to pursue its mission, expansion or contraction and the reallocation of capacity, and improvements to operations control systems. [41] Among these categories of action, managers view process improvement as the mechanism through which they often take advantage of technological innovation. But technological innovation is neither deterministic nor autonomous. It results from a series of choices pursued by managers and events occurring in the marketplace (which is itself affected by others' choices and actions). In the strategic business plan of new customers and generators, DG is viewed as a potentially new process for the creation of electricity, a basic commodity that serves as a critical input into business activities. Its price, availability, security, and quality may affect an organization's ability to produce the products or services that define its mission.
The most common business model for DG adoption and growth may consist of one that partners new consumers and generators with DG contractors. By doing so, companies seeking electricity and heat do not need to develop extensive expertise outside their core competencies. Rather, they can depend on contractors who have developed the skills and knowledge from operating DG units for other firms and who can provide other services. The employment of DG would therefore not become a distraction to a company's core competencies or become a burden to its mission.
Even with a competent contractor working to develop DG units for a firm, an array of risks confronts the nontraditional new player in the utility system. The list of risk factors includes the impediments noted earlier. However, business managers may look at them differently, combining several into these general categories:
• Technological uncertainty. Owners must deal with the chance that the DG technology will not perform as reliably or as efficiently as its specifications. In particular, interconnected DG systems may actually reduce the reliability of a distribution grid due to the inability of grid operators to control unit dispatches under rapidly changing conditions. • Fuel cost uncertainty. The price of natural gas, coal, and oil will affect the financial performance of any DG unit that uses any of these fuels. Owners of renewable energy technologies (such as wind turbines) will not need to worry about the cost of energy resources, but the price they receive for surplus power will depend to a large extent on the price of conventional fuels that provide competitive benchmarks prices.
• Load uncertainty. The growth and volatility of electricity demand within the transmission grid that serves the NGC must be considered. Ironically, efforts to reduce the cost of electricity in the form of demand-side response could reduce the value of DG units that are most beneficial in supplanting expensive peak-load power from utilities. [42] • Electricity price uncertainty. The financial performance of a DG unit depends on the cost of electricity from utilities that the unit supplants.
Future prices of electric power in the United States remain highly uncertain due to variability in fuel costs, regulation, and technological change.
• Regulatory and public policy uncertainty. The viability of DG projects depends, to a certain extent, on the treatment by government entities.
NGCs need to consider the chance that any tax incentives, subsidies, or easements associated with a DG implementation may be offered or repealed by future legislatures and executives. Given the spotty history of utility system restructuring and deregulation, it is difficult to predict the effects of government policies on evolving electricity markets.
These uncertainties create financial (and nonfinancial) risks for NGCs. As with any capital investment option, the cash flows of a proposed DG facility must be viewed as random variables, and measures of financial risk must be computed from the probability distributions of these variables. Investments that look acceptably profitable on the basis of expected cash flows may be deemed unworthy when the risk associated with these cash flows is estimated. The energy industry is a motivating force behind new methods for assessing risk, and it currently is replacing the traditional evaluation of net present value with the view of investments in generation capacity as real options. This more enlightened view of financial risk directs the investor's attention to both the downside loss potential as well as the upside gain potential. [43] 
Aggregated Dispatch as a Means to Stimulate Economic Momentum with DG
This analysis suggests a host of potential and real problems faced by businesses considering use of DG technologies, making DG a somewhat risky, marginally profitable opportunity. Nevertheless, opportunities for the use of DG exist, especially if structured in a new fashion, namely as an element of an aggregated entity that can dispatch power to the grid. In such a way, a DG owner might obtain a significant revenue stream while also enhancing grid reliability and reducing pollution levels. It would employ electricity and waste heat for its own needs when power remains cheap, and it would sell surplus power to the grid when spot prices for electricity are high. To participate in the market for power, DG units must be dispatched at times and locations where they are most needed.
This kind of dispatch requires coordination of all DG units in a distribution grid. By doing so, owners provide society with some of the promised benefits of DG while also making financial profits for themselves. Ridge National Laboratories, may desire to employ DG technologies as a way to obtain secure electrical supplies for government facilities as a way to deal with potential terrorist attacks or natural disasters. In fact, because government managers may view DG positively for such uses, they may be among the largest (and quickest) adopters of the new small-scale technology, thereby providing its proponents with a substantial market.
Conclusion
Made up of a diverse set of economic, educational, legal, administrative, and technical components, the American electric utility system developed much momentum during most of the twentieth century. Supporting the use of large-scale hardware that exploited economies of scale, the system's stakeholders generated huge amounts of power at declining costs and produced financial and social benefits for millions of people. The system's momentum, a metaphor for the social and technical components aligned in such a way as to resist change, grew consistently and seemed to favor everyone.
But starting in the 1960s, problems with the standard (and previously improving) generating technology became evident. Combined with the energy crisis of the 1970s and the political response to it, however, momentum change began occurring. The monopolistic utility industry first saw competitors generate power using small-scale and cost-effective equipment that employed raw energy more efficiently. Government incentives also spurred increased production of power from environmentally preferable equipment such as wind turbines. Following passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, partly as a result of the Gulf War, the existing structure of the utility system changed further, with wholesale and retail competition further eroding the momentum of the former system.
Efforts to restructure and partially deregulate the utility system have not been without difficulties. It appears that, like in other industries, restructuring the utility system will remain a messy business and may take a long time for stakeholders to work out a new paradigm. The inherent messiness highlights the notion that momentum in the system has changed and that stakeholders-some new ones in particular, such as those that employ distributed generation technologies-have an opportunity to introduce new ideas for how the utility system will emerge in the near future. This paper has suggested that, at a time when momentum change is occurring, opportunities exist for the increased employment of DG technologies in the utility system. Focusing on possible strategies for various business entities, it concludes that ominous risks appear for companies that seek to generate power largely for themselves.
In many cases, it is understandable why DG has not yet seen greater penetration into the marketplace. However, some of those risks would diminish if government policy recognized better the subsidies it offers to conventional fuel users and made companies pay for the significant external costs they impose on society. Such a policy may be difficult to pursue for political and economic reasons. Still, policy should then provide incentives for DG enterprises to recognize the real, but difficult-to-quantify benefits to society overall, such as increased reliability, heightened security for the grid, and reduced (or stabilized) transmission costs.
Even if policy makers fail to pursue some of these measures, DG may still be embraced by the business community in a novel form. This paper suggests a business model that employs experienced contractors to serve as load-serving entities for DG units owned by several parties. The contractors would dispatch the units in a real-time marketplace and earn revenues when spot prices surpass the cost of producing power.
Recent experiments with this business model appear promising. The authors plan to continue to explore ways to make DG a larger element in a utility system whose momentum continues to shift.
